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Democracy and the Right to Vote: 
Rethinking Democratic Rights under  
the Charter
YASMIN DAWOOD *
This article addresses the Supreme Court of Canada’s theory of democracy and the right to 
vote. After setting forth the Court’s general approach to democracy, I develop a new conceptual 
framework for the Court’s approach to democratic rights. First, I argue that the Court has 
adopted a “bundle of democratic rights” approach to the right to vote. By this I mean that the 
Court has interpreted the right to vote as consisting of multiple democratic rights, each of 
which is concerned with a particular facet of democratic governance. Second, I claim that the 
democratic rights recognized by the Court are best understood as structural rights. Structural 
rights theory offers a new way to account for the individual and institutional dimensions of 
democratic rights. I argue that the Court’s recognition of multiple democratic rights, and its 
attention to the structural dimension of these rights, has enabled it to regulate the democratic 
process with respect to a wide array of complex issues, including representation, electoral 
redistricting, the role of money in elections, individual participation, political equality, and the 
regulation of political parties.
Cet article aborde la théorie de la Cour suprême du Canada relativement à la démocratie et 
au droit de vote. Après avoir énoncé dans ses grandes lignes l’approche de la Cour en matière 
de démocratie, je montre que la Cour a adopté envers le droit de vote une approche fondée 
sur un ensemble de droits démocratiques. J’entends par là que la Cour interprète le droit 
de vote comme reposant sur de multiples droits démocratiques, dont chacun s’applique à 
un aspect particulier de la gouvernance démocratique. Deuxièmement, je fais valoir que les 
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thank Lisa Austin, Benjamin Berger, Wen Cheng Chen, Karen Knop, Jamie Mayerfeld, 
Jennifer Nedelsky, Kent Roach, Matthew Stubbs, Lorraine Weinrib, anonymous referees, 
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Toronto Frontiers of Constitutional Jurisprudence in China and Canada Conference for very 
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droits démocratiques reconnus par la Cour se comprennent mieux comme droits structurants. 
La théorie des droits structurants offre une nouvelle façon de tenir compte des dimensions 
individuelle et institutionnelle des droits démocratiques. Je prétends que la reconnaissance 
par la Cour de droits démocratiques multiples, et son attention à la dimension structurante 
de ces droits, lui permet de réglementer le processus démocratique en fonction d’une vaste 
gamme de questions complexes telles la représentation, le redécoupage électoral, le rôle de 
l’argent dans les élections, la participation individuelle, l’égalité politique et la réglementation 
des partis politiques.
IN RECENT YEARS, confl icts over the ground rules of the democratic process have 
garnered considerable attention. For instance, the Robocalls scandal, which erupted 
after voters received fraudulent and misleading calls during the 2011 federal 
election, was not only the subject of a recent court challenge1 but also triggered 
proposals to reform the Canada Elections Act.2 Th e Supreme Court of Canada (the 
Court) recently considered whether a contested election in the Etobicoke Centre 
riding should be annulled.3 Citizens and political parties alike  have also debated 
1. See McEwing v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 525, 228 ACWS (3d) 584. Mosley J. of 
the Federal Court held that while electoral fraud did occur, it did not aff ect the outcome of 
the elections in the six ridings at issue. See also Laura Payson, “Federal Court won’t remove 
MPs over election robocalls” CBC News (23 May 2013), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/story/2013/05/23/pol-federal-court-robocall-allegations.html>.
2. Bruce Cheadle, “Robo-call court ruling ‘should bolster’ reform: former Elections Canada 
chief,” Th e Globe and Mail (27 May 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/robo-call-court-ruling-should-bolster-reform-former-elections-canada-chief/
article12182777/>.
3. Opitz v Wrzesnewskyj, 2012 SCC 55, [2012] 3 SCR 76 [Opitz]. For an analysis of the Opitz 
decision, see Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Dissent: Reconsidering the Judicial Review 
of the Political Sphere” (2013) 63 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 59 at 67-71.
I. DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE ........................................................................................... 257
A. The Supreme Court’s Theory of Democracy ...................................................................... 258
B. A Bundle of Democratic Rights .......................................................................................... 259
C. Democratic Rights as Structural Rights ............................................................................ 262
D. Structural Rights and the Law of Democracy .................................................................... 266
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE, REDISTRICTING, AND REGULATING POLITICAL PARTIES ............................ 269
A. The Right to Effective Representation................................................................................ 269
B. The Right to Meaningful Participation ............................................................................... 276
III. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, AND ELECTORAL SPEECH ..................................... 281
A. The Right to Equal Participation ........................................................................................ 281
B. The Right to a Free and Informed Vote .............................................................................. 285
C. Democratic Complexity ...................................................................................................... 290
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 294
DAWOOD, DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 253
the merits of electoral reform,4 subsidies for political parties,5 and the prorogation 
of Parliament6 to name but a few issues that have been the subject of signifi cant 
national debate. Th is renewed interest in democracy and the right to vote is taking 
place not only in Canada but in many jurisdictions around the world.7
Th is article considers the Court’s theory of democracy and the right to vote. As 
a start, I claim that the Court has played an important role in defi ning Canadian 
democracy. Th e Court has identifi ed the principle of democracy as a “fundamental 
value in our constitutional law and political culture,”8 and many of its decisions 
have implications for democratic rights and the functioning of the governmental 
system. More directly, the Court has issued several decisions about the democratic 
process itself. Th ese decisions, which are referred to as the “law of democracy,”9 
4. See Peter Aucoin & Lori Turnbull, “Th e Democratic Defi cit: Paul Martin and Parliamentary 
Reform” (2003) 46:4 Can Pub Adm 427; Ailsa Henderson, “Consequences of Electoral 
Reform: Lessons for Canada” (2006) 32:1 Can Pub Pol’y 41; Russell Isinger, “Paradigms 
Lost: German Federal and Electoral Solutions to Canada’s Constitutional Problems” 
(1995) 6:2 Const Forum 61; Henry Milner, ed, Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: 
Electoral System Reform in Canada and its Provinces (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2004); 
Denis Pilon, Th e Politics of Voting: Reforming Canada’s Electoral System (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2007); Bryan Schwartz, “Proportional Representation for Canada?” (2001) 
28:2 Man LJ 133; Mark E Warren & Hilary Pearse, eds, Designing Deliberative Democracy: 
Th e British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); R 
Kent Weaver, “Improving Representation in the Canadian House of Commons” (1997) 30:3 
Can J Pol Sci 473; Trevor Knight, “Unconstitutional Democracy? A Charter Challenge to 
Canada’s Electoral System” (1999) 57:1 UT Fac L Rev 1.
5. See “Chrétien urges Harper not to kill party subsidy” CBC News (9 May 2011), online: CBC 
News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/05/09/pol-chretien-party-subsidies.
html>; Jeff rey Simpson, “Party fi nancing: End the public subsidy, but raise the individual 
limit,” Th e Globe and Mail (8 August 2010) A15. 
6. Peter W Hogg, “Prorogation and the Power of the Governor General” (2009) 27 NJCL 
193; Warren J Newman, “Of Dissolution, Prorogation, and Constitutional Law, Principle 
and Convention: Maintaining Fundamental Distinctions During a Parliamentary Crisis” 
(2009) 27 NJCL 217; Peter Russell & Lorne Sossin, eds, Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Marc D Walters, “Th e Law Behind the 
Conventions of the Constitution: Reassessing the Prorogation Debate” (2011) 5 J Parl’t & 
Pol L 131.
7. Samuel Issacharoff , “Fragile Democracies” (2007) 120:6 Harv L Rev 1405; Samuel 
Issacharoff , “Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies” (2004) 82:7 Tex L Rev 
1861.
8. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 61, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession 
Reference]. 
9. Samuel Issacharoff , Pamela Karlan & Richard Pildes, Th e Law of Democracy: Legal Structure 
of the Political Process, 3d ed (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 2007) at 1-3. Th e “law of 
democracy” is referred to by other labels including election law and political law. See Gregory 
Tardi, Th e Law of Democratic Governing (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) vol 1-2; J Patrick Boyer, 
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have addressed a number of topics, including electoral redistricting, campaign 
fi nance, rules regulating political parties, the disenfranchisement of prisoners, 
opinion polls, and contested elections.10 Many of these cases have arisen under 
section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides that every 
citizen has the right to vote in federal and provincial elections.11 Other cases have 
arisen under sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter, which protect the freedoms of 
expression and association, respectively, and section 15, which guarantees equality.12 
Th e Court’s law of democracy jurisprudence not only includes cases involving 
election law, it also includes cases that are concerned with the democratic process 
and democratic rights.
In its law of democracy cases, the Court has developed a complex set of theories 
about democracy, the right to vote, and democratic rights more generally. Th ere 
are two important features of the Court’s approach. First, I claim that the Court 
has adopted a “bundle of democratic rights” approach to its law of democracy 
cases.13 By this I mean that the Court has recognized multiple democratic rights, 
Election Law in Canada: Th e Law and Procedure of Federal, Provincial and Territorial Elections 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987); Craig Forcese & Aaron Freeman, Th e Laws of Government: 
Th e Legal Foundations of Canadian Democracy (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005).
10. Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan), [1991] 2 SCR 158, 81 DLR 
(4th) 16 [Saskatchewan Reference] (concerning the drawing of electoral boundaries); Sauvé 
v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 438, 64 CRR (2d) 1 [Sauvé I] (inmate voting 
rights); Haig v Canada (Chief Electoral Offi  cer), [1993] 2 SCR 995, 105 DLR (4th) 577 
[Haig] (residency requirements during referenda); Harvey v New Brunswick (Attorney 
General), [1996] 2 SCR 876, 178 NBR (2d) 161 [Harvey] (membership in provincial 
legislatures); Libman v Quebec, [1997] 3 SCR 569, 151 DLR (4th) 385 [Libman] 
(referendum spending limits); Th omson Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 
1 SCR 877, 38 OR (3d) 735 [Th omson Newspapers] (public opinion polls); Sauvé v Canada 
(Chief Electoral Offi  cer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519 [Sauvé II] (inmate voting rights); 
Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37, [2003] 1 SCR 912 [Figueroa] (benefi ts 
for political parties); Harper v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 SCR 
827 [Harper] (third party election spending); R v Bryan, 2007 SCC 12, [2007] 1 SCR 527 
[Bryan] (distribution of election results); Opitz, supra note 3 (contested elections).
11. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter].
12. Colin Feasby, “Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime” 
(2007) 45:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 514 at 539 [Feasby, “Constitutional Questions”]. Feasby 
defi nes the law of the political process as encompassing decisions that fall under ss 2, 3, and 
15.
13. Th e “bundle of rights” thesis is used most often to describe property rights. It is based 
upon Wesley Hohfeld’s position that a right in rem consists of a number of rights among 
individuals. See JE Penner, “Th e ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43:3 UCLA 
L Rev 711 at 712.
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each of which is concerned with a particular facet of democratic governance and 
participation. Th e Court has treated the right to vote as a plural right; that is, 
properly understood, the right to vote is an umbrella concept that consists of 
several democratic rights. Specifi cally, I claim that the Court has recognized the 
following four democratic rights in its election law jurisprudence: (1) the right 
to eff ective representation; (2) the right to meaningful participation; (3) the right to 
equal participation; and (4) the right to a free and informed vote.
Th e Court has described the fi rst two rights—the right to eff ective representation 
and the right to meaningful participation—with specifi c reference to section 3’s 
protection of the right to vote. But the Court has also developed a theory of 
democratic rights that extends beyond the textual language of section 3. Th e 
Court has recognized two additional democratic rights—the right to equal 
participation and the right to a free and informed vote. Th e Court’s recognition 
of these two rights is relevant for the Court’s general understanding of the right to 
vote, even though these rights do not attach specifi cally to section 3. Instead, these 
rights appear to be derived by the Court from an overarching constitutional 
commitment to the principle of democracy.
Second, I claim that the Court’s decisions have developed a novel approach to 
democratic rights. Specifi cally, the Court has paid attention to both the individual 
and the institutional aspects of democratic rights. I suggest that this is a crucially 
important feature of the Court’s theory of democracy and democratic rights. 
In previous work, I have used the language of “structural rights” to capture the 
particular nature of democratic rights.14 Structural rights are individual rights that 
take into account the broader institutional framework within which these rights 
are defi ned, held, and exercised. Rights do not exist in a vacuum, but are instead 
exercised within an institutional framework that is constituted by relations of power. 
Consider, for example, the right to an equal vote. Although the right to an equal 
vote is held by individuals, it is based implicitly on an assessment of how power 
ought to be distributed across a political system. Th e right to an equal vote can 
be described as a structural right because it is intelligible only with respect to the 
larger institutional infrastructure within which this right is exercised. Democratic 
rights have a structural dimension because an individual’s exercise of his or her 
rights takes place within an existing organization of social and political power.
Structural rights theory off ers a new way to account for the individual and 
institutional nature of democratic rights. Although the Court does not employ 
14. Yasmin Dawood, “Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights 
Approach to Judicial Review” (2012) 62:4 UTLJ 499 at 503-04 [Dawood, “Electoral 
Fairness”].
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the language of structural rights, I contend that its theory of democratic rights 
is notable for its attention to the complex nature of democratic rights. Th e four 
democratic rights mentioned above—the right to eff ective representation, the 
right to meaningful participation, the right to an equal vote, and the right to a 
free and informed vote—are best understood as structural rights. Although the 
Court has described these rights as being held by individuals, it is attuned to the 
ways in which the exercise of these democratic rights is infl uenced by the larger 
social and political infrastructure within which these individuals fi nd themselves.
In addition, I argue that it is possible for courts to regulate the structural 
dimensions of the democratic system by using an individual rights regime. In 
particular, I claim that the Court has used the democratic rights described above 
to regulate the political process as a whole. Th e Court’s approach provides it not 
only with the ability to protect the activities of voting and standing for offi  ce as 
contemplated by the text of section 3, but also to regulate the structure of democratic 
institutions and the political system more broadly. Th e “bundle of democratic 
rights” approach has given the Court considerable fl exibility in responding to a 
wide range of issues—such as electoral redistricting, campaign fi nance regulation, 
political equality, and the regulation of political parties. By recognizing the dual 
individual-institutional nature of democratic rights, the Court has developed nuanced 
jurisprudential tools to supervise various aspects of democratic governance—not only 
the structures, institutions, and processes of democracy, but also the values, ideals, 
and principles of democracy. By diversifying the concept of the “right to vote” so 
that it includes a number of democratic rights, the Court is able to intervene with 
respect to a wide array of political institutions and actors.
Th ese democratic rights, I suggest, are indispensable to the Court’s supervision 
of democracy. Yet as many scholars in the Canadian law of democracy fi eld have 
noted,15 there are a number of tensions and inconsistencies among the cases. 
I claim that many of the internal tensions in the Court’s law of democracy 
decisions have their roots in confl icts among these democratic rights. Th ese rights 
are not necessarily consistent with one another because they refl ect the plural 
and at times confl icting values of democracy itself. Instead of eliminating these 
inconsistencies, the Court should, in future cases, explicitly identify the competing 
democratic rights that are at stake in the cases and justify the conclusion it reaches 
as to which right to favour. 
In sum, the Court’s approach to the right to vote has provided it with the 
ability to intervene with respect to a wide range of issues aff ecting the electoral 
process and democratic governance. Th e Court’s diversifi cation of the right to vote, 
15. See Part III(C).
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and its attention to the individual and institutional nature of democratic rights, 
has aff orded it considerable fl exibility when supervising the democratic process. 
In addition, the Court’s approach can be used to address other important issues, 
such as the partisan self-dealing in the design of election laws.16 Not only does the 
Court’s approach provide an alternative view of democratic rights, it also serves 
as a useful paradigm for courts in other jurisdictions that are likewise faced with 
the challenge of regulating the democratic process.
Th is article proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that the Court has played 
an important role in defi ning Canadian democracy. In addition to discussing 
the Court’s theory of democracy, this Part also sets forth the article’s conceptual 
framework. I claim, fi rst, that the Court has adopted a “bundle of democratic 
rights” approach to the right to vote, and second, that these democratic rights 
are best understood as structural rights. Part I also shows how the conceptual 
framework off ers a reconceptualization of the existing jurisprudence, in addition 
to bringing together competing strands in the scholarly literature on the Canadian 
law of democracy.
Parts II and III engage in an examination of the Court’s law of democracy 
decisions in order to illustrate the salience of the conceptual framework outlined in 
Part I. Part II focuses on the fi rst two rights—the right to eff ective representation and 
the right to meaningful participation. Part III focuses on the next two rights—the 
right to equal participation and the right to a free and informed vote. In addition 
to demonstrating that the right to vote consists of a bundle of rights, Parts II and 
III also illustrate the structural dimension of these democratic rights. Although 
these democratic rights are indispensable to the Court’s supervision of democracy, 
Part III shows how confl icts among these rights have created tensions in some of 
the Court’s decisions. Th is Part then proposes that in future cases the Court should 
explicitly identify the competing democratic rights that are at stake in the cases 
and justify the conclusion it reaches as to which right to favour.
I. DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Th is Part sets forth the Court’s theory of democracy and proposes a new conceptual 
framework for the Court’s approach to democratic rights. It argues that the Court 
has adopted a “bundle of democratic rights” approach to its law of democracy 
jurisprudence. In addition, this Part claims that the democratic rights recognized 
by the Court are best understood as structural rights. 
16. For an elaboration of this argument, see Dawood, “Electoral Fairness,” supra note 14 at 
500-61.
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A. THE SUPREME COURT’S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
Th e Court has played an important role in defi ning Canadian democracy. In the 
Secession Reference,17 the Court identifi ed the principle of democracy as one of 
four principles that “inform and sustain the constitutional text; they are the vital 
unstated assumptions upon which the text is based.”18 According to the Court, 
the principle of democracy “has always informed the design of our constitutional 
structure, and continues to act as an essential interpretive consideration to this 
day.”19 As such, the democracy principle is a “baseline against which the framers 
of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have 
always operated.”20 Th e Court thus interpreted the Constitution as establishing 
a democratic government even though the democracy principle is not explicitly 
mentioned in the constitutional text.21
Crucially, the Court described democracy as having both “an institutional 
and an individual aspect.”22 Th e institutional dimension refers to the fact that 
federal and provincial representatives are elected by the people.23 Th e individual 
dimension refers to the right to vote in federal and provincial elections—a right 
that is protected by section 3 of the Charter.24 Th e dual nature of democracy is 
evident in the Court’s defi nition of democracy as “the process of representative 
and responsible government and the right of citizens to participate in the political 
process as voters and as candidates.”25 As discussed in more detail in Part I(C), 
the Court’s recognition of these two dimensions of democracy—individual and 
institutional—forms an important aspect of the Court’s theory of democratic rights.
Democracy is also associated with substantive goals such as self-government, 
and with fundamental values such as equality, human dignity, and social justice.26 
In R v Oakes,27 a seminal case that established the Court’s approach to Charter 
claims, the Court described the basic values of democracy as follows:
17. Secession Reference, supra note 8 at para 61. 
18. Ibid at para 49. Th e Court identifi ed four constitutional principles: federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minority rights (ibid at paras 49, 
60-61).
19. Ibid at para 62.
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid at paras 61, 63.
23. Ibid at para 65.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid [footnotes omitted].
26. Ibid.
27. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes].
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Th e Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic 
society which I believe to embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide 
variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political 
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.28
In addition, as discussed in the Secession Reference, democracy “cannot exist 
without the rule of law.”29 Th e law “creates the framework within which the ‘sovereign 
will’ is to be ascertained and implemented.”30 Democratic institutions are legitimate 
to the extent that they “allow for the participation of, and accountability to, the 
people, through public institutions created under the Constitution.”31
Th e Court also emphasized the importance of democratic discussion and 
deliberation.32 It stated that “[n]o one has a monopoly on truth, and our system 
is predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best solutions to 
public problems will rise to the top.”33 Th e Court observed that a democratic 
system must consider dissenting voices by “seeking to acknowledge and address 
those voices in the laws by which all in the community must live.”34 Th e Court’s 
theory of democracy is notable for its inclusion of a number of principles and 
values, including legitimacy, participation, deliberation, equality, and dissent. 
In addition, the Court is attentive to the fundamental role played by the legal 
framework in both constituting and fostering democratic institutions and values.
B. A BUNDLE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
Th e Court has decided several cases that fi t under the “law of democracy” banner.35 
Th ese cases have arisen under section 3 (the right to vote), but they have also arisen 
under sections 2(b) and 2(d) (freedoms of expression and association), and section 
15 (equality guarantee) of the Charter.36 Th e right to vote is explicitly protected by 
section 3 of the Charter, which provides that every citizen has the right to vote for 
elections for the House of Commons or a provincial legislature and to be qualifi ed 
for membership in those houses.37 In its decisions, the Court has emphasized the 
28. Ibid at para 67.
29. Secession Reference, supra note 8 at para 67.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid at para 68.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. See supra note 10 for a list of the cases.
36. Feasby, “Constitutional Questions,” supra note 12 at 539.
37. Charter, supra note 11, s 3.
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importance of section 3, declaring, for instance, that the “right of every citizen 
to vote … lies at the heart of Canadian democracy.”38  In addition, the Court 
proclaimed that the “right to vote is fundamental to our democracy and the 
rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it require not deference, 
but careful examination.”39 Th ere are two additional Charter provisions that 
establish democratic rights. Section 4 sets a maximum duration of fi ve years for 
the life of the House of Commons or a provincial legislature; this period can be 
extended in the event of a national crisis such as war provided that two-thirds of 
the members vote for an extension.40 Section 5 guarantees a sitting of Parliament 
and the legislatures at least once every year.41 It is signifi cant that the democratic 
rights protected under sections 3, 4, and 5 cannot be overridden by exercising the 
notwithstanding clause in section 33.
Th ere exists an extensive scholarly literature on the Court’s law of democracy 
decisions.42 While it is beyond the scope of this article to summarize this literature, it 
is possible to briefl y identify some of the perspectives that exist. Some commentators 
suggest that the Court has adopted a relatively coherent approach to the law of 
democracy. Colin Feasby argues, for example, that some of the Court’s decisions 
can be explained by its commitment to an “egalitarian model” of the democratic 
process.43 Under such an approach, the role of the Court is to foster equality by 
ensuring that candidates and political parties are competing on a level playing 
fi eld. In a recent decision, the Court confi rmed that Parliament had adopted an 
egalitarian model of elections.44
In contrast, other scholars argue that the Court’s approach to these cases 
is inconsistent. Christopher Bredt and Markus Kremer claim that the Court’s 
interpretation of section 3 does not provide much predictive guidance for the 
resolution of future cases, and moreover, that the Court’s posture of deference to the 
legislature is noticeably inconsistent from case to case.45 In addition, Christopher 
38. Sauvé II, supra note 10 at para 1.
39. Ibid at para 9.
40. Charter, supra note 11, s 4.
41. Ibid, s 5.
42. Some of this literature is also discussed below in Parts II and III.
43. Colin Feasby, “Libman v Quebec (AG) and the Administration of the Process of Democracy 
under the Charter: Th e Emerging Egalitarian Model” (1999) 44:1 McGill LJ 5 [Feasby, 
“Egalitarian Model”]. In more recent work, Feasby has argued that the egalitarian model 
explains most, but not all, of the Court’s decision making. See Feasby, “Constitutional 
Questions,” supra note 12 at 540.
44. Harper, supra note 10 at paras 62-63; Libman, supra note 10 at para 41.
45. Christopher D Bredt & Markus F Kremer, “Section 3 of the Charter: Democratic Rights at 
the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 17 NJCL 19 at 20.
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Bredt and Laura Pottie assert that the “egalitarian model is neither a comprehensive 
answer to the issues posed by electoral regulation, nor has the concept been applied 
consistently by the courts.”46 Th ey further claim that the “electoral process involves 
a complex interplay between a number of diff erent participants with diff ering roles 
and access to a variety of resources.”47 In addition, there is a signifi cant literature 
on the so-called political markets (or structural) approach to the law of democracy, 
which is principally concerned with the ways in which political actors manipulate 
election laws in order to entrench themselves in power.48 Th e law of democracy 
literature has also focused attention on possible reforms to the electoral process.49
Th is article contributes to the law of democracy literature by developing an 
analytic framework for the Court’s approach to democratic rights. My fi rst claim 
is that the Court has adopted a “bundle of democratic rights” approach to its law 
of democracy jurisprudence. Th e bundle of democratic rights argument off ers a 
reconceptualization of the existing jurisprudence, one that brings together the 
competing strands found in the cases. Specifi cally, I argue that the Court has 
identifi ed a number of democratic rights that govern its law of democracy decisions. 
After a detailed examination of the law of democracy decisions (in Parts II and III, 
below), I identify four main rights established by the Supreme Court: (1) the right 
to eff ective representation; (2) the right to meaningful participation; (3) the right 
to equal participation; and (4) the right to a free and informed vote. 
Th e Court has described the fi rst two rights—the right to eff ective representation 
and the right to meaningful participation—as falling within the ambit of section 3 
of the Charter. Th e next two rights—the right to equal participation and the right 
to a free and informed vote—are conceptually related to the right to vote, but they 
are not described by the Court as falling within the ambit of section 3. Although 
the right to vote is grounded in section 3 of the Charter, some of the Court’s 
decisions under sections 2 and 15 of the Charter have had an important impact 
on the meaning of the right to vote, construed more generally. For example, in 
cases that consider whether campaign fi nance regulations violate section 2(b), the 
Court has paid signifi cant attention to the functioning of the democratic system.50 
As described in Part III, the Court appears to have derived these two rights from 
the Constitution’s overarching commitment to the principle of democracy. 
46. Christopher D Bredt & Laura Pottie, “Liberty, Equality and Deference: A Comment on 
Colin Feasby’s ‘Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process’” (2005) 29 
Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 291 at 292.
47. Ibid.
48. Th e structural approach is discussed in detail below in Part I(D).
49. See supra note 4.
50. See Part III, below, for a discussion of these cases.
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Th ere is already some judicial support for the idea that the Charter protects 
multiple democratic rights under section 3. In Figueroa v Canada, for instance, 
the Court stated that “the democratic rights entrenched in s. 3 ensure that each 
citizen has an opportunity to express an opinion about the formation of social 
policy and the functioning of public institutions through participation in the 
electoral process.”51 Writing for the majority, Justice Iacobucci described section 3 
as containing entrenched “democratic rights.”52 Justice LeBel’s concurring opinion 
in Figueroa provides further support for the claim that the Court has announced 
a set of interlocking and at times confl icting democratic principles. Justice LeBel 
referred to the complexity of such concepts as eff ective representation and 
meaningful participation, noting that such “multifaceted concepts ... comprise 
a number of intertwined and often opposed principles.”53
In addition, I argue that these democratic rights, or at least some combination of 
them, are present in most of the Court’s law of democracy decisions. Although these 
rights are often compatible with one another, they are also in considerable confl ict 
in certain contexts. As described in more detail in Part III(C), I suggest that we 
should not be overly troubled by the existence of confl ict and inconsistency among 
these various democratic principles; indeed, such confl ict and inconsistency is 
to be expected given the highly complex and multifaceted nature of democracy 
itself. To this extent, I agree with those scholars who argue that the Court’s law 
of democracy decisions cannot be explained by adhering to a single value or 
model.54 I also agree with those scholars who claim that the egalitarian model 
describes a signifi cant dimension of the Court’s jurisprudential approach to the 
electoral system.55
C. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AS STRUCTURAL RIGHTS
As the Court recognized in the Secession Reference, democracy has both individual 
and institutional aspects.56 I argue that democratic rights can be conceived of in 
a similar way; that is, democratic rights have both an individual dimension and 
an institutional dimension. While individuals are the rights-holders, the exercise 
of these rights takes place within a particular political, institutional, and societal 
context. I have used the term “structural rights” to capture the complex nature of 
51. Figueroa, supra note 10 at para 29 [emphasis added].
52. Ibid [emphasis added].
53. Ibid at para 96.
54. See Bredt & Kremer, supra note 45; Bredt & Pottie, supra note 46.
55. See Feasby, “Egalitarian Model,” supra note 43.
56. Secession Reference, supra note 8 at paras 61, 63.
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democratic rights.57 Structural rights are individual rights that take into account 
the broader institutional framework within which rights are defi ned, held, and 
exercised.58 Th e participation of individuals is the key focus (hence the emphasis 
on rights), but individuals participate within an institutional framework that is 
constituted by relations of power (hence the emphasis on structure). Structural 
rights theory off ers a new way to account for the individual and institutional 
nature of democratic rights.
Consider, for example, the right to vote. Th e right to vote presupposes the 
existence of a broader institutional framework. By the broader institutional 
framework, I am referring not only to governmental and societal institutions, but 
also to the mechanisms by which votes are counted, the confi guration of electoral 
districts, the rules by which political parties are regulated, and so forth. As Justice 
Lebel noted in Figueroa, the right to vote:
is ultimately a right of each individual citizen, [but it] cannot be understood 
without reference to its social and systematic context. Th e right to vote and be a 
candidate do not fi t the classic model of a negative individual right to be free from 
government interference. Citizens cannot exercise s. 3 rights on their own, without 
the state’s involvement. Rather s. 3 imposes a positive obligation on the government 
to set up an electoral system which, in turn, provides for democratic governance in 
accordance with the choices of Canadian voters.59
Th e right to vote is not even intelligible in the absence of an elaborate 
infrastructure consisting of elections, constituencies, political parties, and 
governmental institutions. While structural rights theory can be applied to 
various rights, it is particularly applicable to democratic rights since they have both 
an individual and an institutional dimension. Although the Court does not use the 
57. Dawood, “Electoral Fairness,” supra note 14 at 500-01.
58. James Gardner defi nes structural rights as those rights, such as the right to vote, that are 
valued instrumentally for maintaining a system of democratic government. See James A 
Gardner, “Th e Dignity of Voters—A Dissent” (2010) 64 U Miami L Rev 435 at 443-44.    
Steven G Gey discusses another use of the term “structural rights.” See Gey, “Th e Procedural 
Annihilation of Structural Rights” (2009) 61:1 Hastings LJ 1. For Gey, structural rights 
are “constitutional provisions that structure the government’s interaction with its citizens 
and limit the power of government in order to prevent government overreaching” (ibid 
at 4). Structural rights include any allocation of power within government, and include 
constitutional provisions that protect the freedom of speech, the separation of church and 
state, due process, equal protection, and voting rights (ibid at 4-14). Gey argues that the 
US Supreme Court has restricted the jurisdiction and remedial authority of federal courts, 
thereby putting obstacles in the way of holding the government accountable (ibid at 22-23).
59. Figueroa, supra note 10 at para 133.
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term “structural rights,” its approach demonstrates a noteworthy attention to the dual 
nature of democratic rights.
Although structural rights manifest in various ways, it is possible to identify 
four situations in which a right could be described as structural. Th ese four 
possible forms of structural rights are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, 
there is considerable overlap between these forms. In addition, these four forms are 
meant to illustrate the concept of structural rights rather than to provide a strict 
categorization. In general, structural rights arise when: (1) the right presupposes 
an institutional framework without which the right cannot be exercised; (2) the 
right is framed in such a way that it accounts for how the broader institutional 
framework impacts the exercise of the right; (3) the right is intelligible only with 
reference to a system-wide account of how power, fairness, or equality ought to be 
distributed; or (4) the right accounts for the ways in which the activities of other 
individuals or private entities aff ects the exercise of the right. A given right could 
conceivably take all four forms.
Th e fi rst form of structural rights arises when the right presupposes 
an institutional framework without which the right cannot be exercised. For 
example, the right to vote presupposes the existence of an entire institutional 
framework, which includes, among other things, elections, candidates, political 
parties, constituencies, and legislatures. Without these institutions, the right to 
vote cannot be exercised. 
Th e second form of structural rights arises when the right is framed in such 
a way that it accounts for how the broader institutional framework aff ects the 
right. For example, the Court stated in Figueroa that the right to meaningful 
participation was aff ected by certain rules that denied benefi ts to smaller political 
parties.60 Although these rules did not prevent citizens from casting a ballot, they 
diminished the ability of citizens to participate fully in the democratic process. 
Th e right to meaningful participation is a structural right because it is based on the 
idea that an individual’s ability to participate is aff ected by the broader institutional 
framework within which her participation is taking place. In contrast to the fi rst 
form, which is concerned with institutions that are directly required for voting to 
take place, the second form is focused on institutions that have an indirect eff ect 
on the strength of the right to vote. 
Th e third form of structural rights arises when the right is intelligible only with 
reference to a system-wide assessment of how power, fairness, or equality ought 
to be distributed. An example of the third form of structural rights is the right 
60. Ibid at para 39.
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to an equal vote. Although the right to an equal vote is held by individuals, it is 
based implicitly on an assessment of how power ought to be distributed across a 
political system. Justice Lebel observes, for instance, that “[e]valuating the fairness 
of the system involves looking at how each citizen fares in relation to others.”61 
Th e fourth form of structural rights arises when the right accounts for the ways 
in which the activities of other individuals or private entities aff ect the exercise 
of the right. For example, the right of equal participation, as recognized by the 
Court in Harper v Canada,62 is based on the idea that an individual’s power in a 
democracy can be aff ected by the activities of other individuals who are exercising 
their democratic rights. Citizens with greater fi nancial means can buy more political 
speech, and thereby drown out the voices of those with fewer means.63 Although the 
right to equal participation is held by individuals, it accounts for the ways in which 
the activities of other individuals or private entities aff ect the exercise of the right.
Th e Court’s attention to the institutional framework within which rights 
are exercised is conceptually consistent with the contextual approach to section 
1 analysis. Under the contextual approach, courts consider how the legislative 
provision aff ects the right in practice, rather than simply balancing the abstract 
value of the right against the abstract value of the restriction. As Justice Wilson 
explained in Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG),64 “[o]ne virtue of the contextual 
approach … is that it recognizes that a particular right or freedom may have a 
diff erent value depending on the context.”65 For example, political speech might 
be deemed more valuable than commercial speech. Th e structural rights approach 
is contextual in some respects because it is concerned with how rights operate in 
practice within an institutional setting, but it is not contextual in the same sense 
as section 1 balancing. Th e contextual approach demands that courts weigh the 
value of the right in practice against the value of the restriction in practice when 
engaging in section 1 balancing. By contrast, structural rights are contextual not 
because of section 1 balancing but because the very defi nition of the right contains 
an institutional dimension within it.
61. Ibid at para 133.
62. Harper, supra note 10 at para 61.
63. Ibid at para 62.
64. Edmonton Journal (Th e) v Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326, 64 DLR (4th) 577 
[Edmonton Journal].
65. Ibid at 1355.
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D. STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
Th e Court has identifi ed the following four rights in its law of democracy decisions: 
the right to eff ective representation, the right to meaningful participation, the right 
to equal participation, and the right to a free and informed vote. I argue that these 
four democratic rights are best understood as structural rights. Although the Court 
does not employ the language of “structural rights,” I contend that its theory of 
democratic rights is notable for its attention to the complex individual-institutional 
nature of democratic rights. As described in Parts II and III, the Court has described 
these rights as being held by individuals, but it is also attuned to the ways in which 
the larger social and political infrastructure aff ects the exercise of these rights.
In addition, I argue that it is possible for courts to regulate the structural 
dimensions of the democratic system by using an individual rights regime. In 
particular, I claim that the Court has used these four democratic rights to regulate the 
political process as a whole. By diversifying the right to vote to include subsidiary 
democratic rights, and by recognizing the dual individual-institutional nature of 
these democratic rights, the Court has supervised various aspects of the democratic 
process such as electoral redistricting, campaign fi nance regulation, political equality, 
and the regulation of political parties. Th e Court’s approach enables it not only to 
protect the activities of voting and standing for offi  ce, as provided for in section 
3, but also to regulate the democratic system more broadly. 
Th e concept of structural rights bears affi  nity with other “structural” approaches 
within the scholarly literature.66 In the American election-law fi eld, the structural 
approach was fi rst developed by the political markets theorists. According to the 
political markets theorists, democratic politics are “akin in important respects to 
a robustly competitive market—a market whose vitality depends on both clear 
rules of engagement and on the ritual cleansing born of competition.”67 Dominant 
political parties, however, have a propensity to manipulate the rules of the game 
in order to reduce electoral competition.68 By locking up political institutions, 
dominant parties are able to secure permanent partisan advantage. Th e political 
66. For a discussion of the structural approach to constitutional interpretation, see Charles 
L Black, Jr, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1969) at 6; Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Th eory of the 
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) at 74; Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional 
Interpretation (Williston, VA: Blackwell, 1991) at 12-13; J Harvie Wilkinson III, “Our 
Structural Constitution” (2004) 104:6 Colum L Rev 1687 at 1687-88.
67. Samuel Issacharoff  & Richard H Pildes, “Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process” (1998) 50:3 Stan L Rev 643 at 646.
68. Ibid at 644.
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markets approach diff ers from the traditional individual rights approach that is 
used by courts in the United States.69 Under the individual rights approach, courts 
employ a balancing test that weighs an individual’s right to equal protection under 
the law against the interests of the state.70
By contrast, political markets theorists argue that courts should focus on the 
structure of partisan competition. As Richard Pildes argues, the judicial review 
of democratic processes implicates the “systemic consequences that institutional 
structures and legal rules generate for political practice.”71 Instead of balancing 
individual rights against state interests, courts should develop structural solutions 
to prevent partisan self-entrenchment.72 While the individualist and structural 
approaches are usually viewed as alternative approaches, scholars have observed 
that certain election law cases can be described as containing both individualist 
and structural elements.73
In the Canadian law of democracy literature, several scholars have argued 
for a political markets/structural approach to the Court’s cases.74 I have described 
this development in the fi eld as the “structural turn” in the Canadian law of 
democracy literature.75 Th ese scholars have argued that the Court should respond 
to the problem of partisan self-dealing in election law, and they have applied the 
political markets/structural approach to a number of topics in Canadian politics.76 
69. Richard Hasen, Th e Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v Carr to 
Bush v Gore (New York: New York University Press, 2003) at 48-49.
70. Th is approach is used when the formal right to access to the vote has been denied, or when 
a group’s voting power has been diluted as a result of, for instance, a new redistricting map. 
See South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 86 S Ct 803 (1966); Harper v Virginia Board 
of Elections, 383 US 663, 86 S Ct 1079 (1966); White v Regester, 412 US 755, 93 S Ct 2332 
(1973); Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 91 S Ct 1858 (1971).
71. Richard H Pildes, “Foreword: Th e Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics” (2004) 
118:1 Harv L Rev 28 at 41.
72. Ibid.
73. Heather K Gerken, “Lost in the Political Th icket: Th e Court, Election Law, and the 
Doctrinal Interregnum” (2004) 153:1 U Pa L Rev 503 at 512; Guy-Uriel E Charles, 
“Democracy and Distortion” (2007) 92:4 Cornell L Rev 601 at 657.
74. Th ese scholars include Heather MacIvor, Colin Feasby, Christopher Manfredi, Mark Rush, 
Christopher Bredt, Laura Pottie, and Michael Pal. For a detailed discussion, see Dawood, 
“Electoral Fairness,” supra note 14 at 511-18.
75. Ibid at 503.
76. See Colin Feasby, “Constitutional Questions,” supra note 12; Colin Feasby, “Th e Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Political Th eory and the Constitutionality of the Political Finance 
Regime” in KD Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff , eds, Party Funding and Campaign Financing 
in International Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 243 [Feasby, “Political Finance”]; Colin 
Feasby, “Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process” (2005) 29 Sup Ct 
L Rev (2d) 237 [Feasby, “Democratic Process”]; Heather MacIvor, “Do Canadian Political 
(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL268
Th e common concern is that political insiders are manipulating the rules of the 
electoral game to secure a partisan advantage.
What is the diff erence between the “structural” approach and the “structural 
rights” approach? Th e structural approach holds that courts should use system-wide 
structural solutions to resolve problems like partisan gerrymandering because the 
conventional individual rights/equal protection approach is not well equipped 
to respond to such problems. By contrast, the structural rights approach holds 
that courts can use individual rights to remedy the structural defi ciencies of the 
democratic system.
In previous work, for example, I developed a structural rights approach to 
respond to the problem of partisan self-dealing in election laws.77 Specifi cally, I 
argue that the Court should interpret the right to vote as encompassing a new 
democratic right—the right to a fair and legitimate democratic process.78 Th e Court 
has already recognized a “right to participate in a fair election,”79 and I argue that 
this right should be theorized and expanded. I show how the Court could use the 
right to a fair and legitimate democratic process to remedy the problem of partisan 
rule-making in election laws.80
Th e structural rights approach described in this article extends beyond the 
problem of partisan self-dealing to encompass the Court’s regulation of the structure 
of democratic institutions as a whole. Th e Court’s bundle of democratic rights 
Parties Form a Cartel?” (1996) 29:2 Can J Pol Sci 317 [MacIvor, “Cartel”]; Heather MacIvor, 
“Judicial Review and Electoral Democracy: Th e Contested Status of Political Parties under 
the Charter” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 479 [MacIvor, “Contested Status”]; Heather 
MacIvor, “Th e Charter of Rights and Party Politics: Th e Impact of the Supreme Court 
Ruling in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General)” (2004) 10:4 IRPP Choices 1 [MacIvor, 
“Party Politics”]; Christopher Manfredi & Mark Rush, “Electoral Jurisprudence in the 
Canadian and U.S. Supreme Courts: Evolution and Convergence” (2007) 52:3 McGill LJ 
457 [Manfredi & Rush, “Evolution and Convergence”]; Christopher Manfredi & Mark 
Rush, Judging Democracy (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2008) [Manfredi & Rush, Judging 
Democracy]; Mark Rush & Christopher Manfredi, “From Deference and Democracy to 
Dialogue and Distrust: Th e Evolution of the Court’s View of the Franchise and its Impact 
on the Judicial Activism Debate” (2009) 45 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 19 [Rush & Manfredi, 
“Deference and Democracy”]; Bredt & Pottie, supra note 46; Michael Pal, “Breakdowns in 
the Democratic Process and the Law of Canadian Democracy” (2012) 57:4 McGill LJ 299; 
Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy, Power, and the Supreme Court: Campaign Finance Reform in 
Comparative Context” (2006) 4:1 Int’l J Const L 269 (2006); Dawood, “Electoral Fairness,” 
supra note 14.
77. Ibid at 503-05.
78. Ibid at 519-23.
79. Figueroa, supra note 10 at para 51.
80. Dawood, “Electoral Fairness,” supra note 14 at 550-56.
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approach, combined with its recognition of the individual-institutional nature 
of democratic rights, has enabled it to supervise various aspects of the electoral 
process. Rather than focusing narrowly on protecting individual rights, the Court 
has also addressed the system-wide aspects of the democratic process, such as the 
structure of representation, electoral redistricting, the role of money in elections, 
and the regulation of political parties. Th us, a central claim of this article is that 
it is possible for courts to regulate the structural dimensions of the democratic 
system by using individual rights.
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE, REDISTRICTING, AND REGULATING 
POLITICAL PARTIES
Th is Part focuses on two of the democratic rights recognized by the Court—the 
right to eff ective representation and the right to meaningful participation. In 
addition to describing the Court’s “bundle of democratic rights” approach to 
the right to vote, this Part argues that the rights to eff ective representation and 
meaningful participation, respectively, can be understood as structural rights. 
Th e Court used these rights to regulate democratic participation, the structure of 
political representation, the rules governing political parties, and the redrawing 
of electoral boundaries.
A. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
Th e right to eff ective representation was fi rst announced by the Supreme Court 
in Reference re Provincial Boundaries (Saskatchewan) (Saskatchewan Reference).81 
At issue in the case was whether Saskatchewan’s electoral boundaries violated the 
right to vote as protected by section 3 of the Charter. 82 In Saskatchewan’s electoral 
map, there were variances in the population sizes of the electoral districts that were 
within plus or minus 25 per cent of the provincial quotient.83 Th e independent 
boundary commission that was charged with redrawing Saskatchewan’s electoral 
81. Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 10. 
82. For a discussion of the constitutional provisions that aff ect the drawing of electoral 
boundaries, see Kent Roach, “One Person, One Vote? Canadian Constitutional Standards for 
Electoral Distribution and Districting” in David Small, ed, Drawing the Map: Equality and 
Effi  cacy of the Vote in Canadian Electoral Boundary Reform (Toronto: Dundern Press & Royal 
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing and Canada Communication Group, 
1991) 1 at 8-9 [Roach, “One Person, One Vote?”].
83. Th e provincial quotient is calculated by dividing the total voting population in the province 
by the number of ridings. Th e two northern ridings varied within plus or minus 50 per cent 
of the provincial quotient. See Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 10 at 175, 190.
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districts was also bound by two restrictions: First, urban and rural ridings must 
adhere to a strict quota, and second, urban ridings must coincide with municipal 
boundaries.84 As a result of these restrictions, the urban districts had more voters on 
average than the rural districts, and were therefore under-represented as compared 
to the rural areas.85 Th e resulting electoral map thus tended to favour rural voters.
In a fi ve to three decision, Justice McLachlin (as she was then) held on behalf 
of the majority that the electoral boundaries did not infringe the Charter.86 Th e 
majority rejected the idea that electoral districts must adhere to the one person, one 
vote principle.87 In a key passage, Justice McLachlin stated that “the purpose of the 
right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, 
but the right to ‘eff ective representation.’”88 According to the majority, the “values 
and principles animating a free and democratic society are arguably best served by 
a defi nition that places eff ective representation at the heart of the right to vote.”89 
Th e majority also concluded that the disparity between the rural and urban areas 
did not violate the right to vote.90 In addition, the majority held that the 
84. Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, SS 1986-87-88, c E-6.1. Th e drawing of electoral 
boundaries in Canada is governed in part by a federal statute. For more information, see 
the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, RSC 1985, c E-3. For a discussion, see Ronald 
E Fritz, “Th e 1990s Federal Boundaries Readjustments and the Charter” (1998) 61:2 Sask 
L Rev 467 at 470-73 [Fritz, “Federal Electoral Boundaries”]. For a history of boundary 
adjustment in Canada, see Ronald E Fritz, “Th e Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Case and 
Its Complications” in John C Courtney, Peter MacKinnon & David E Smith, eds, Drawing 
Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral Values (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1992) 71 at 
74-77 [Fritz, “Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries”]. See also Robert G Richards & Th omson 
Irvine, “Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries: An Analysis” in John C Courtney, Peter 
MacKinnon & David E Smith, eds, Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral 
Values (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1992) 48 at 48-49. See also John C Courtney, 
“Redistricting: What the United States Can Learn From Canada” (2004) 3:3 Election LJ 
at 493-95. For a discussion of how boundary adjustment takes place, see John C Courtney, 
Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2001). See also, Ron Levy, “Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary 
Politics in the Administrative Arena” (2008) 53:1 McGill LJ 1 at 9-10.
85. Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 10 at 169.
86. Joining the majority were Justices La Forest, Gonthier, McLachlin, Stevenson, and Iacobucci.
87. In 1964, the US Supreme Court adopted a one person, one vote principle for state legislative 
districts in Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 84 S Ct 1362 (1964).
88. Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 10 at 183.
89. Ibid at 188.
90. Th e Court found that the quota of seats for the rural and urban areas coincided to a large 
degree with the voting populations of the two areas. McLachlin J was also persuaded 
that rural areas are more diffi  cult to serve because they present diffi  culties in terms of 
transportation and communication. Ibid at 192-95.
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outcome, and the process by which the map was determined, did not infringe 
section 3.91 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Cory concluded that there had been 
an infringement of section 3, and furthermore that the government had failed to 
justify the infringement under section 1.92
Th e Saskatchewan Reference decision has generated a large body of scholarly 
commentary.93 Various criticisms have been raised over the years with respect to the 
decision. Some scholars have argued that the conception of eff ective representation 
is problematic.94 Commentators have also criticized the Court’s rejection of the 
91. Ibid at 197.
92. Cory J focuses on the process by which the electoral map was drawn. For more information, 
see Manfredi & Rush, Judging Democracy, supra note 76 at 73-76.
93. Th ere are a number of excellent analyses of the case. See Fritz, “Federal Electoral Boundaries,” 
supra note 84 at 467-70. See also Fritz, “Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries,” supra note 
84; Ronald Fritz, “Challenging Electoral Boundaries Under the Charter” (1999) 5:1 Rev 
Const Stud 1 at 9-12 [Fritz, “Challenging Electoral Boundaries”]. Th e Saskatchewan 
Reference decision has sparked considerable academic commentary comparing the approach 
both among provinces and between countries. For a comparison of diff erent countries, see 
Nicholas Aroney, “Democracy, Community, and Federalism in Electoral Apportionment 
Cases: the United States, Canada, and Australia in Comparative Perspective” (2008) 58:4 
UTLJ 421. See also Elizabeth Daly, “Idealists, Pragmatists and Textualists: Judging Electoral 
Districts in America, Canada and Australia” (1998) 21:2 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 261.
94. See Mark Carter, “Reconsidering the Charter and Electoral Boundaries” (1999) 22:1 Dal 
LJ 53. Carter, for example, argues that eff ective representation is a “problematic concept” 
because its “vagueness invites extensive judicial interpretation and it promises little assistance 
to citizens who are concerned that the right to vote should provide some protection against 
cynical political activity” (ibid at 58). Other scholars contend that the various factors that 
comprise eff ective representation are vague and indeterminate. See Fritz, “Saskatchewan 
Electoral Boundaries,” supra note 84. Fritz argues that although such factors as “community 
of interest, rate of growth, the conditions of communication and transportation networks, 
and special geographic conditions” should be taken into account, such factors should rarely 
justify major deviations from voter parity (ibid at 78-82). See also Fritz, “Challenging 
Electoral Boundaries,” supra note 93 at 5-17 (discussing factors and concluding that the 
factors are so complex that courts are likely to defer to boundary commissions). David 
Johnson argues, for example, that the factors are “questionable at best and unprincipled 
at worst.” See David Johnson, “Canadian Electoral Boundaries and the Courts: Practices, 
Principles and Problems” (1994) 39:1 McGill LJ 224 at 226. He provides a detailed analysis 
of the indeterminate and vague nature of such factors as community of interest, and the 
practical and theoretical problems raised by the incorporation of minority representation. 
Fritz argues that McLachlin J “does not establish a hierarchy of importance for the other 
factors” other than parity of voting power, which is of “prime importance.” See Fritz, 
“Challenging Electoral Boundaries,” supra note 93 at 10. Fritz argues further that the 
individual is faced with “considerable uncertainty in assessing whether his right has been 
infringed” (ibid).
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one-person-one-vote standard,95 while others have argued that the Charter does 
not mandate one person, one vote.96 Kent Roach has argued that the Court’s 
decision was neither surprising nor disturbing because it accorded with the 
Court’s commitment to minorities and other non-majoritarian communities of 
interest.97 Other scholars have argued that the Court’s decision failed to remedy the 
disparity between the urban and rural voters, and moreover, that the Court ignored 
the possibility that the rules governing the boundary drawing were motivated by 
partisan considerations.98
Th is article focuses on another dimension of the Saskatchewan Reference 
decision, namely the Court’s theory of democratic rights. Th e Court employs 
a “purposive approach” when determining the scope and meaning of a Charter 
right.99 In Hunter v Southam the Court stated that a purposive approach identifi es 
the scope of a Charter right by “specif[ying] the purpose underlying” the right, 
or by “delineat[ing] the nature of the interests it is meant to protect.”100 Similarly 
in R v Big M Drug Mart,101 the Court stated that the “the meaning of a right or 
freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the 
95. See Brian Studniberg, “Politics Masquerading as Principles: Representation by Population 
in Canada” (2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ 611 at 629. See also Michael Pal & Sujit Choudhry, “Is 
Every Ballot Equal? Visible-Minority Vote Dilution in Canada” (2007) 13:1 IRPP Choices 1.
96. See FL Morton & Rainer Knopff , “Does the Charter Mandate ‘One Person, One Vote?’” 
(1992) 30:2 Alta L Rev 669 at 671. Morton and Knopff  argue that there is “no explicit 
requirement of voter equality in section 3 or any other Charter section. Nor is there any 
legislative history to suggest that the framers of the Charter intended section 3 to include an 
implied voter equality principle” (ibid). Allan Tupper contends, however, that “Morton and 
Knopff ’s arguments fl ow from a dated and static view of democracy” and that “the ‘right to 
vote,’ to be meaningful in a democracy, must embrace the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ 
at the ballot box.” See Allan Tupper, “Democracy and Representation: A Critique of Morton 
and Knopff ” (1992) 30:2 Alta L Rev 695 at 696-97. 
97. Kent Roach, “Chartering the Electoral Map into the Future” in John C Courtney, Peter 
MacKinnon & David E Smith, eds, Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral 
Values (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1992) 200 at 200-01, 208. In addition, Roach observes 
that the distribution formula under the Constitution is “consistent with the traditional 
practice of tempering representation by population with concerns about equitable regional 
representation.” Roach, “One Person, One Vote?,” supra note 82 at 10.
98. Dawood, “Electoral Fairness,” supra note 14 at 537-45; Carter, supra note 94 at 57.
99. For a general analysis of the purposive approach, see Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation 
in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 378; Pierre-André Côté, Th e 
Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 533; David M 
Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: Th e Canadian Production of Constitutional Review 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 15-16.
100. Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 11 DLR (4th) 641 at 157.
101. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 116, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M].
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purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light 
of the interests it was meant to protect.”102
In order to determine the purpose of a right, the Court stated that judges 
should pay attention to “the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to 
the language chosen to articulate the specifi c right or freedom, to the historical origins 
of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of 
the other specifi c rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text 
of the Charter.”103 A purposive interpretation is “a generous rather than a legalistic 
one, aimed at fulfi lling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals 
the full benefi t of the Charter’s protection,” but one that nonetheless places the 
right in “its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts.”104 As Jonathan 
Black-Branch puts it, the purposive approach “aims at teasing out the core values 
underpinning a free and democratic society.”105 Th e Court enjoys a fair amount 
of discretion when determining the purpose of a constitutional right.106
In the decision, the Court identifi ed the purpose of the right to vote as yet 
another democratic right—the right to eff ective representation. It is signifi cant 
that the Court interpreted the right to vote as containing a subsidiary democratic 
right within it. Two implications ensue: fi rst, the right to vote can be described 
as consisting of a bundle of democratic rights; second, this approach provides the 
Court with the ability not only to protect the activities of voting and standing for 
offi  ce, as contemplated by the text of section 3, but also to regulate the structure 
of democratic institutions.
It is also signifi cant that the Court described the right to eff ective representation 
in both individual and institutional terms. Although the Court described the right 
to eff ective representation as being held by individuals, it was attuned to the way 
in which the exercise of the right to vote is infl uenced by the larger social and 
political infrastructure in which individuals fi nd themselves. For this reason, I 
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid at para 117.
104. Ibid. For a discussion of the purposive approach in Big M, see Peter W Hogg, “Interpreting 
the Charter of Rights: Generosity and Justifi cation” (1990) 28:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 817 at 
821.  
105. Jonathan L Black-Branch, “Constitutional Adjudication in Canada: Purposive or Political?” 
(2000) 21:3 Stat L Rev 163 at 165.
106. Sidney R Peck, “An Analytical Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (1987) 25:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 13-21; Black-Branch, supra note 
105 at 163; Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (consulted on 10 July 
2012), 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), 36.8(c).
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claim that the right to eff ective representation can be understood as a structural 
right because it situates an individual’s right to vote within a larger social, political, 
and institutional context. Th e right to eff ective representation is based on the idea 
that an individual’s voting power is aff ected by the confi guration of the political 
system as a whole. In Saskatchewan Reference, the Court identifi ed several conditions 
for the achievement of eff ective representation:
Th e fi rst is relative parity of voting power. A system which dilutes one citizen’s 
vote unduly as compared with another citizen’s vote runs the risk of providing 
inadequate representation to the citizen whose vote is diluted.  Th e legislative 
power of the citizen whose vote is diluted will be reduced, as may be access to 
and assistance from his or her representative. Th e result will be uneven and unfair 
representation.107
An important element of eff ective representation is the “relative parity of 
voting power.”108 According to the Court, the “legislative power of the citizen 
whose vote is diluted will be reduced, as may be access to and assistance from his 
or her representative.”109 For this reason, vote dilution leads to an “uneven and 
unfair representation.”110 As Heather Gerken has argued, vote dilution constitutes 
a structural harm because it is implicitly based upon a theory about how legislative 
power should be distributed across a system.111 In a similar way, the right to eff ective 
representation has a structural dimension. Although this right is held by individuals, 
it is premised upon the idea that the power of an individual’s vote is aff ected by the 
way in which political power is distributed system-wide.
Th e Court found that while the parity of voting power is of “prime importance,” 
it is not the only relevant factor. For a start, absolute voter parity is impossible to 
achieve because “[v]oters die, voters move.”112 Even if voter parity is achieved, it 
may not be desirable if it detracts from eff ective representation.113 For these reasons, 
the Court held that there were additional considerations that were relevant to 
achieving eff ective representation:
Factors like geography, community history, community interests and minority 
representation may need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative 
assemblies eff ectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic. Th ese are but 




111. Gerken, supra note 73 at 521.
112. Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 10 at 184.
113. Ibid.
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examples of considerations which may justify departure from absolute voter parity 
in the pursuit of more eff ective representation; the list is not closed.114
Th e Court identifi ed a number of factors—geography, community history, 
community interests, and minority representation—that contribute to the 
eff ectiveness of a representative scheme. All of these factors have an impact on the 
strength of a person’s vote. Th ese factors are institutional—they are concerned with 
the social and political context within which an individual exercises his or her right to 
vote. Redistricting commissions are charged with taking geography and community 
into account because the strength of an individual’s vote is aff ected by the voting 
behaviour of the other individuals within her constituency. Th e Court also noted 
that the concept of eff ective representation recognizes cultural and group identity, 
in addition to enhancing the participation of individuals in the electoral process.115 
A system based on a one person, one vote principle would not be equipped to take 
into account the various factors that aff ect the strength of an individual’s vote. Th e 
Court observed that important democratic values, such as respect for equality, social 
justice, and group rights, are better protected by a democratic system that is based 
upon eff ective representation rather than the one person, one vote principle.116
Th e Court also provided a nuanced account of representation, one that was 
attentive to the structural dimension of the political system. Representation was 
defi ned as “having a voice” in governmental deliberations and the ability to “bring 
one’s grievances” to the attention of the government.117 For the Court, representation 
did not simply mean casting a ballot for the candidate of one’s choice on election 
day. In addition, Justice McLachlin was concerned with the eff ectiveness of the 
representative scheme as a whole. She stated, for instance, that “only those deviations 
should be admitted which can be justifi ed on the ground that they contribute to 
better government of the populace as a whole, giving due weight to regional issues 
within the populace and geographic factors within the territory governed.”118 Th e 
right to eff ective representation can be viewed as a structural right because it is based 
upon the idea that the power of an individual’s vote is aff ected by the way that other 
individuals vote and by the institutional infrastructure that translates votes into seats.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid at 188.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid at 183.
118. Ibid at 185 (quoting Dixon v British Columbia (Attorney General) (1989), 59 DLR (4th) 247, 
4 WWR 393 at 414 (BCSC) [emphasis added]).
(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL276
B. THE RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION
Another strand in the bundle of democratic rights is the right to play a meaningful 
role in the democratic process. Th is right was fi rst announced by the Court in a 
1993 decision, Haig v Canada,119 and later elaborated at length in Figueroa.120 At 
issue in Haig was whether section 3 guaranteed the right to vote in the national 
referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.121 In all provinces and territories except 
Quebec, the referendum took place under federal legislation.122 In Quebec, the 
referendum took place under provincial legislation that imposed a six-month 
residency requirement on all voters.123 Graham Haig, who had moved from 
Ontario to Quebec during the relevant period, was ineligible to vote in Quebec 
because he did not meet the six-month residency requirement and was also ineligible 
to vote in Ontario because he no longer resided in an area covered by the federal 
legislation.124 In Haig, the Court concluded that section 3 was clearly limited to 
the election of representatives to the provincial and federal legislatures, and hence 
did not guarantee the right to vote in a referendum.125 Th e Court distinguished a 
referendum, which is “basically a consultative process, a device for the gathering of 
opinions,” from an election, which is binding on government.126 
Th e Haig decision is important because it introduced another right to the 
bundle of democratic rights protected by section 3. Writing for the majority, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé quoted at length from Saskatchewan Reference on the concept of 
eff ective representation. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé then stated the following:
Th e purpose of s. 3 of the Charter is, then, to grant every citizen of this country the 
right to play a meaningful role in the selection of elected representatives who, 
in turn, will be responsible for making decisions embodied in legislation for which 
they will be accountable to their electorate.127
119. Haig, supra note 10.
120. Figueroa, supra note 10.
121. Th e Charlottetown Accord was an agreement containing proposed amendments to the 
Constitution, signed by the Prime Minister of Canada, the leaders of all the provinces and 
territories and representatives of four aboriginal groups on 29 August 1992. Th e Accord was 
later subjected to concurrent referenda held in Quebec and the remainder of Canada on 26 
October 1992. Haig, supra note 10 at 1007-08.
122. See Referendum Act, SC 1992, c 30.
123. See Referendum Act, RSQ c C-64.1.
124. Haig, supra note 10 at 1009.
125. Ibid at 1033.
126. Ibid at 1032.
127. Ibid at 1031 [emphasis added]. 
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Th e right to play a meaningful role in the democratic process was further 
elaborated in Figueroa.128 In Figueroa, the head of the Communist Party of Canada 
challenged the constitutionality of a requirement that political parties nominate 
candidates in at least fi fty electoral districts in order to register as a political 
party.129 Registered political parties are granted a number of benefi ts under the 
Canada Elections Act, including the right to have party affi  liations listed on the 
ballot, to issue tax receipts for donations received outside the election period, and to 
transfer unspent election funds to the party.130 A majority of the Court held that the 
fi fty-candidate rule violated section 3 and was not justifi able under section 1.131 
Writing for the majority, Justice Iacobucci stated that while eff ective 
representation was a relevant goal under section 3, there was another important 
aspect of section 3:
[T]his Court has already determined that the purpose of s. 3 includes not only the 
right of each citizen to have and to vote for an elected representative in Parliament 
or a legislative assembly, but also to the right of each citizen to play a meaningful 
role in the electoral process. Th is, in my view, is a more complete statement of the 
purpose of s. 3 of the Charter.132
Justice Iacobucci identifi ed the “right of each citizen to play a meaningful role 
in the electoral process” as an essential component of section 3. Justice Iacobucci 
noted that the section 3 rights are “participatory in nature,” rather than being 
focused solely on the composition of Parliament.133 He interpreted section 3 as 
protecting a right of democratic participation:
On its very face, then, the central focus of s. 3 is the right of each citizen to participate 
in the electoral process. Th is signifi es that the right of each citizen to participate in the 
political life of the country is one that is of fundamental importance in a free and 
democratic society and suggests that s. 3 should be interpreted in a manner that 
ensures that this right of participation embraces a content commensurate with the 
importance of individual participation in the selection of elected representatives in 
a free and democratic state.134
Th e “fundamental purpose of s. 3 ... is to promote and protect the right of 
each citizen to play a meaningful role in the political life of the country. Absent 
128. Figueroa, supra note 10.
129. Ibid at para 3.
130. Ibid at para 4.
131. Ibid at para 90.
132. Ibid at para 25.
133. Ibid at para 26.
134. Ibid.
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such a right, ours would not be a true democracy.”135 Participation is essential 
because it ensures that elected representatives are aware of the needs and 
interests of a wide array of citizens.136 For these reasons, the Court concluded 
that democratic participation has an “intrinsic value,” which is “independent 
of its impact upon the actual outcome of elections.”137
Th e Court’s bundle of democratic rights approach became apparent in 
the Figueroa decision. As described in Part I, Justice Iacobucci stated that “the 
democratic rights entrenched in s. 3 ensure that each citizen has an opportunity 
to express an opinion about the formation of social policy and the functioning 
of public institutions through participation in the electoral process.”138 In other 
words, the right to vote, as protected by section 3, is comprised of multiple 
democratic rights. Th is interpretation is supported by Justice Iacobucci’s assertion 
that section 3 was not exhausted by the concept of eff ective representation. In 
addition to the right of each citizen to vote for and be represented by an elected 
offi  cial, the purpose of section 3 also includes the “right of each citizen to play a 
meaningful role in the electoral process.”139 Justice Iacobucci stated that this was 
“a more complete statement” of the scope of the right to vote.140 
Justice LeBel’s concurrence provides additional support for the bundle 
of rights approach. Justice LeBel described the complexity of such concepts 
as eff ective representation and meaningful participation, noting that such 
“multifaceted concepts ... comprise a number of intertwined and often opposed 
principles.”141 He argued that the “concept of meaningful participation, like eff ective 
representation, comprises a number of diff erent aspects.”142 For Justice LeBel there 
thus exists an additional bundle of rights within each right. He also noted that it
can be just as meaningful -- sometimes, perhaps, more so -- to participate as a member of 
a community or a group (such as a political party) as it is to participate as an individual, 
and enhancing opportunities for the fi rst kind of participation almost unavoidably 
entails some cost in terms of purely individualistic participatory values.143 
In other words, the right of meaningful participation can mean a number of things 
depending on the particular context.
135. Ibid at para 30.
136. Ibid at para 28.
137. Ibid at para 29.
138. Ibid [emphasis added].
139. Ibid at para 25.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid at para 96.
142. Ibid at para 118.
143. Ibid.
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In addition, a close examination of the right to meaningful participation 
shows that it can be understood as a structural right. Th e concept of “meaningful 
participation” is based on the idea that an individual’s ability to participate is 
aff ected by the broader institutional framework within which participation is 
taking place. In Figueroa, the Court found that denying the benefi ts of registered 
party status to parties that do not meet the fi fty-candidate threshold undermined 
the “right of each citizen to meaningful participation in the electoral process.”144 
Th e government off ered three objectives to justify the requirement: (1) improving 
the electoral process through public fi nancing of political parties; (2) preserving 
the integrity of the electoral process; and (3) ensuring that a viable governmental 
option is produced by the electoral process.145 Th e Court stated that the fi rst 
and second objectives were pressing and substantial but that they failed the 
proportionality test.146 As for the third objective—ensuring that a viable 
governmental option is produced by the electoral process—the Court found that 
it was “extremely problematic.”147 Th e Court asserted that legislation expressly 
enacted to diminish the likelihood of electing certain candidates violates the basic 
principles of democratic government.148
Th e Court found that political parties are essential for the participation 
of ordinary citizens. Th ey act “as both a vehicle and outlet for the meaningful 
participation of individual citizens in the electoral process.”149 Th us, the structure 
of rules governing political parties has a direct impact on the ability of individual 
citizens to play a meaningful role in democratic politics.150 In addition, the Court 
found that the contribution of a political party to the electoral process did not 
depend on its ability to form a government.151 Political parties are essential to 
participation “[i]rrespective of their capacity to infl uence the outcome of an 
election.”152 Smaller parties “are both a vehicle for the participation of individual 
citizens in the open debate occasioned by the electoral process and an outlet for 
the expression of support for political platforms that are diff erent from those 
144. Ibid at para 47.
145. Ibid at para 61. 
146. Ibid at paras 62, 70, 72.
147. Ibid at para 80.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid at para 39.
150. For a discussion of the role of political parties in a democracy, see Janet L Hiebert, “Money 
and Elections: Can Citizens Participate on Fair Terms Amidst Unrestricted Spending?” 
(1998) 31:1 Can J Pol Sci 91 at 108.
151. Figueroa, supra note 10 at para 39.
152. Ibid.
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adopted by political parties with a broad base of support.”153 Th e Court stated that 
all political parties act as “a vehicle for the participation of individual citizens in 
the political life of the country.”154 As Heather MacIvor notes, the Court treated 
political parties as “key players in democratic self-government.”155 Political parties, 
whether large or small, make it possible for the views of individuals to be represented 
in a national debate.156
Th e right to meaningful participation is a structural right because it is attuned 
to the institutional and social context within which participation takes place. Th e 
participation of individuals in democratic politics is impacted by the rules that 
govern political parties. Th e Court’s attentiveness to the interplay between the 
individual and institutional aspects of participation is similar to its approach to 
eff ective representation. For both of these rights, the Court provided a nuanced 
account of the distribution of power within a political system, and the ways in 
which the rules of democracy aff ect this distribution. Although these rights are 
held by individuals, the Court took into account the institutional framework 
within which these rights are exercised. In addition, the Court used these rights 
to regulate complex problems involving representation, democratic participation, 
political parties, and electoral redistricting.
A remaining question involves the constitutional status of the right to eff ective 
representation and the right to meaningful participation. Th e Court described these 
two rights as the “purpose” or “focus” of the section 3 right to vote. It is not evident 
that these rights enjoy the same constitutional status as entrenched Charter rights. 
Th e right to vote as protected by section 3 of the Charter is treated as an inviolable 
right. Th e constitutional status of the “right to eff ective representation” and the 
“right to meaningful participation” is less clear. Whereas the section 3 right to vote 
might be viewed as a “trump”157 that acts as a veto in the face of other competing 
interests, the rights to eff ective representation and meaningful participation may 
command less constitutional clout.
I suggest, therefore, that these subsidiary democratic rights, at least in the context 
of the Court’s cases, should not necessarily be viewed as traditional constitutional 
153. Ibid at para 46.
154. Ibid at para 40.
155. MacIvor, “Contested Status,” supra note 76 at 482. According to MacIvor, the Court in 
Figueroa followed a “party-equality” approach because it held that the state is not permitted 
to disadvantage smaller parties by denying them various benefi ts made available to the larger 
parties. See ibid at 479, 486.
156. Figueroa, supra note 10 at para 40.
157. Dworkin argues that “[i]ndividual rights are political trumps held by individuals.” See 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) at xi.
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rights. Th at is, these rights are not necessarily stand-alone constitutional rights that 
give rise to state obligations. To explain their status, it is useful to make a distinction 
between “hard rights” and “soft rights.” I shall defi ne “hard rights” as those rights 
that give rise to state obligations to act or to refrain from acting. Constitutionally 
entrenched rights, such as the right to vote, are hard rights. By contrast, the rights 
to eff ective representation and meaningful participation are better conceived as 
what I shall call “soft rights.” Unlike hard rights, soft rights are quasi-rights that 
serve an interpretive function. By this I mean that these soft rights give meaning 
and content to the Court’s understanding of democracy and the right to vote. 
Th e right to eff ective representation and the right to meaningful participation are 
not necessarily stand-alone constitutional rights, but are instead better conceived 
as soft rights that provide meaning and interpretive content to the right to vote.
III. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, AND 
ELECTORAL SPEECH
Th is Part considers two additional democratic rights recognized by the Court—the 
right to equal participation and the right to a free and informed vote. Th e Court 
recognized these democratic rights in section 2(b) freedom of expression cases. 
Although these rights are conceptually connected to the right to vote, they were 
not described as falling within the ambit of section 3. I suggest that these rights 
attach in a more general sense to an overarching constitutional commitment to 
democratic government.158 Th e Court used these rights to regulate campaign 
fi nance, individual participation, electoral speech, and informed voting.
A. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PARTICIPATION
Th e Court fi rst recognized a “right of equal participation in democratic government” 
in Libman v Quebec (AG).159 At issue in Libman was the constitutionality of the 
third-party spending limits set out in Quebec’s Referendum Act, which laid forth 
the rules for the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.160 Robert Libman, who 
was president of the Equality Party, did not wish to join either the “yes” or the “no” 
position on the referendum question, and instead wished to advocate in favour 
of abstaining from the vote.161 Th e referendum legislation, however, required that 
158. As described in Part I(A), above, the Court has interpreted the Constitution as establishing 
and protecting a democratic form of government.
159. Libman, supra note 10 at para 47. 
160. Ibid at para 1.
161. Harper, supra note 10 at para 60.
(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL282
regulated expenses be incurred only through a national committee, which meant that 
individuals who supported neither option were limited to unregulated expenses.162 
Mr. Libman argued that these restrictions infringed the freedoms of expression and 
association, and the right to equality.163 He argued that any individual or group 
should have the right to receive public funding and to incur regulated expenses.164
Th e Court held that the restrictions infringed the freedom of political 
expression and could not be upheld under section 1 of the Charter.165 It found 
that the provisions did not meet the minimal impairment test because the limits 
imposed on groups that do not affi  liate themselves with the national committees 
are so restrictive that they amount to a total ban.166 It emphasized that “freedom 
of expression is of crucial importance in a democratic society”167 and that the 
“connection between freedom of expression and the political process is perhaps 
the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee, and [that] the nature of this connection is 
largely derived from the Canadian commitment to democracy.”168
In Libman, the Court stated that it was important to “prevent the most affl  uent 
members of society from exerting a disproportionate infl uence by dominating the 
referendum debate through access to greater resources.”169 As noted by Colin Feasby, 
the Court appeared to favour an “egalitarian” approach to the rules governing 
spending during a referendum or an election.170 Th e basic idea is that those with 
greater wealth should not be permitted to control the electoral process and thereby 
disadvantage those with less wealth; that is, disparities in private wealth should 
not be translated into disparities of political infl uence.171 Th e Court described the 
egalitarian aspect of spending limits as follows:
[S]pending limits are essential to ensure the primacy of the principle of fairness 
in democratic elections. Th e principle of electoral fairness fl ows directly from a 
principle entrenched in the Constitution: that of the political equality of citizens. 
162. Libman, supra note 10 at para 14.
163. Ibid at paras 2, 27.
164. Ibid at para 18.
165. Ibid at paras 35, 85.
166. Ibid at para 82.
167. Ibid at para 28.
168. Ibid at para 29, citing R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 61 CCC (3d) 1 at para 89.
169. Libman, supra note 10 at para 41.
170. Feasby, “Egalitarian Model,” supra note 43 at 8, 31-32.
171. Ibid at 9-11. (Drawing on the work of John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1972); Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 2d ed (New York: 
Free Press, 1995); Owen Fiss, Th e Irony of Free Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1996). 
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If the principle of fairness in the political sphere is to be preserved, it cannot be 
presumed that all persons have the same fi nancial resources to communicate with 
the electorate.172
Th e Court then recognized a “right of equal participation in democratic 
government.”173 Th is right was discussed again in Harper.174 At issue in Harper 
was the constitutionality of third-party spending limits as provided for in the 
Canada Elections Act.175 Th ird-party spending refers to campaign spending that 
is conducted by individuals or groups that are neither candidates nor political 
parties. Although the provisions of the Act had been struck down by the lower 
courts176 as violations of the Charter’s guarantees of freedom of expression and 
association, a six-to-three majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the third-party spending limits. Th e Court majority confi rmed that Parliament 
had adopted an egalitarian model of elections, under which wealth is the main 
obstacle that prevents individuals from enjoying an equal opportunity to participate 
in the electoral process.177 According to the Court, spending limits are required 
to prevent the most affl  uent citizens from “monopolizing election discourse” and 
thereby preventing other citizens from participating on an equal basis.178 Th e Court 
held that although the spending limits infringed upon the freedoms of expression 
and association guaranteed by the Charter,179 the provisions were nonetheless 
justifi able under section 1.180
In Harper, the majority noted that in Libman that it had “endorsed several 
principles applicable to the regulation of election spending generally and of 
independent or third party spending specifi cally.”181 Th e fi rst principle is the 
right to equal participation, which the Court described as follows:
172. Libman, supra note 10 at para 47.
173. Ibid.
174. Harper, supra note 10.
175. See Canada Elections Act, SC 2000, c 9. For a history of the Harper decision and a discussion 
of political fi nance, see Richard Haigh, “He Hath a Heart of Harping: Stephen Harper 
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(2004) 42:2 Alta L Rev 429 at 446; Jennifer Smith & Herman Bakvis, “Judicial Review 
and Electoral Law” in MW Westmacott & Hugh Mellon, eds, Political Dispute and Judicial 
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176. 2001 ABQB 558, 93 Alta LR (3d) 281; 2002 ABCA 301, [2002] 14 Alta LR (4th) 4.
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[1] If the principle of fairness in the political sphere is to be preserved, it cannot be 
presumed that all persons have the same fi nancial resources to communicate with the 
electorate. … To ensure a right of equal participation in democratic government, laws 
limiting spending are needed to preserve the equality of democratic rights and ensure 
that one person’s exercise of the freedom to spend does not hinder the communication 
opportunities of others. Owing to the competitive nature of elections, such spending 
limits are necessary to prevent the most affl  uent from monopolizing election discourse 
and consequently depriving their opponents of a reasonable opportunity to speak and be 
heard [equal dissemination of points of view].182
Th e Court thus identifi ed a “right of equal participation in democratic 
government,” which I will refer to as the “right to equal participation.” Th e 
second principle is “the right of electors to be adequately informed of all the political 
positions advanced by the candidates and by the various political parties,”183 which 
I refer to as the right to a free and informed vote, and which is discussed in Part 
III(B) below. Th e third, fourth, and fi fth principles concerned the scope of spending 
limits, issue advocacy, and limits on independent spending, respectively.184 Th e 
Court made it clear that by endorsing these principles, it had eff ectively adopted 
the egalitarian model of elections. Th e right to equal participation is therefore 
“consistent with the egalitarian model of elections adopted by Parliament as an 
essential component of our democratic society.”185
I claim that the right to equal participation can be described as a structural 
right. Th is right has an individual aspect since, in the words of the Court, it 
is “premised on the notion that individuals should have an equal opportunity 
to participate in the electoral process.”186 It also has a structural aspect since, as 
described by the Court, it “promotes an electoral process that requires the wealthy 
from being prevented from controlling the electoral process to the detriment of others 
with less economic power.”187 In Libman, the Court stated that it was important to 
prevent “the most affl  uent members of society from exerting a disproportionate infl uence 
by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater resources.”188 Given 
the competitive nature of elections, spending limits are required to protect the 
equality of democratic rights and to prevent “the most affl  uent from monopolizing 
election discourse and consequently depriving their opponents of a reasonable 
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opportunity to speak and be heard.”189 Likewise in Harper, the Court stated that 
“the egalitarian model promotes an electoral process that requires the wealthy to 
be prevented from controlling the electoral process to the detriment of others with 
less economic power.”190 Th e Court was thus attentive to the interplay between 
political power and wealth. Private citizens who spend their own funds to purchase 
advertising time from a private media corporation in order to participate in politics 
undermine the democratic rights of those citizens who lack the fi nancial means 
to engage in political speech. Citizens with greater fi nancial means can buy more 
political speech, and thereby exert greater political infl uence. For this reason the 
Court in Libman was seeking “an equality of participation and infl uence between 
the proponents of each option.”191 
Th e Court thus recognized that an individual’s power in a democracy can be 
aff ected by the activities of other individuals who are exercising their democratic 
rights. Th e right to participate in the electoral process is understood within a larger 
systemic account of the distribution of wealth and political power in society. In sum, 
the right to equal participation is structural because it is based on the idea that an 
individual’s rights are aff ected by how other individuals exercise their democratic 
rights and by the institutional framework within which these rights are exercised.
B. THE RIGHT TO A FREE AND INFORMED VOTE
Th e fi nal right concerns the right to a free and informed vote. Versions of this 
right have appeared in a number of cases including Th omson Newspapers Co v 
Canada (AG),192 Libman,193 Harper,194 and Bryan.195 An early version of the right 
to an informed vote fi rst appeared in Th omson Newspapers.196 At issue in Th omson 
Newspapers was whether an opinion poll ban violated the right to vote in section 
3 and the freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Charter.197 Th e Canada 
Elections Act prohibited the publication or dissemination of opinion poll results in 
the last three days of an election period.198 Th e government argued that although 
189. Ibid.
190. Harper, supra note 10 at para 62.
191. Libman, supra note 10 at para 41.
192. Th omson Newspapers, supra note 10.
193. Libman, supra note 10.
194. Harper, supra note 10.
195. Bryan, supra note 10.
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the opinion poll ban infringed the freedom of expression, it was nonetheless 
justifi able under section 1.199 Th e government’s objective was to “to prevent the 
potentially distorting eff ect of public opinion survey results that are released late 
in an election campaign leaving insuffi  cient time to assess their validity.”200 Th e 
rationale behind the ban was thus twofold: fi rst, to ensure that the opinion polls 
did not unduly infl uence voters; and second, to prohibit the release of poll data 
that could not be verifi ed and contested in the three days before an election.201
Writing for a majority, Justice Bastarache found that the opinion poll ban 
infringed the freedom of expression, and moreover, that it could not be justifi ed 
under section 1.202 Th e Court concluded that the type of speech at issue was 
clearly political speech: “there can be no question that opinion surveys regarding 
political candidates or electoral issues are part of the political process and, thus, 
at the core of expression guaranteed by the Charter.”203 In its section 1 analysis, 
the majority was not persuaded by the government’s justifi cations.204 Although 
the majority found that the government’s objective to protect voters from the 
infl uence of potentially inaccurate poll data was pressing and substantial,205 it 
held that the opinion poll ban did not pass the minimal impairment stage of the 
test.206 Th e dissent, written by Justice Gonthier, found that the opinion poll ban 
was consistent with the guarantee of eff ective representation because poll results 
that “cannot be assessed in a timely manner may actually deprive voters of the 
eff ective exercise of their franchise.”207
Th e right to a free and informed vote can be viewed as a structural right. 
When describing this right, the Court was attuned to the individual and 
institutional aspects of exercising the franchise. In Th omson Newspapers, for 
instance, the Court acknowledged that information furnished by a private 
media corporation is politically signifi cant. An individual’s right to vote is 
aff ected by information about how other citizens are voting. Th e Court also 
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acknowledged that the ban aff ects the rights of voters and the rights of media 
and pollsters. Th e Court thus drew a connection between information and 
democratic participation:
Th is is a complete ban on political information at a crucial time in the electoral 
process. Th e ban interferes with the rights of voters who want access to the most 
timely polling information available, and with the rights of the media and pollsters 
who want to provide it. It is an interference with the fl ow of information pertaining 
to the most important democratic duty which most Canadians will undertake in 
their lives: their choice as to who will govern them.208
Justice Bastarache noted that the “purpose of providing more accurate 
information to Canadian voters is that they are more capable of making a free 
and informed choice, which engenders a freer and fairer election process.”209 Th e 
Court rejected the argument that voters would be misled by the polls, stating 
that “Canadian voters must be presumed to have a certain degree of maturity 
and intelligence. Th ey have the right to consider the results of polls as part of 
a strategic exercise of their vote.”210 Justice Bastarache stated that the Court 
should presume that “the Canadian voter is a rational actor who can learn from 
experience and make independent judgments about the value of particular 
sources of electoral information.”211
In later cases, however, the Court became increasingly concerned that the 
structural eff ects of the informational imbalances would impair electoral fairness. In 
Libman, the Court upheld restrictions in third-party spending in order to “prevent 
the most affl  uent members of society from exerting a disproportionate infl uence 
by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater resources.”212 In 
addition, the Court stated that the election spending regime “is designed to permit 
an informed choice to be made by ensuring that some positions are not buried by 
others.”213 Whereas in Th omson Newspapers an informed choice was associated with 
unregulated access to information, in Libman an informed choice was associated 
with restrictions on the kind of information to which voters would be exposed.
Th e right to a free and informed vote, although evident in nascent form in 
Th omson Newspapers and Libman, was explicitly identifi ed in Harper, and later 
208. Ibid at para 127.
209. Ibid at para 98.
210. Ibid at para 101.
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212. Libman, supra note 10 at para 41.
213. Ibid.
(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL288
elaborated at length in Bryan.214 In Harper, the Court recognized a number of 
principles that, taken together, endorse the egalitarian model.215 Th e Court described 
the second principle as follows:
Spending limits are also necessary to guarantee the right of electors to be adequately 
informed of all the political positions advanced by the candidates and by the various 
political parties [free and informed vote]… .216
Th e Court thus identifi ed the “right of electors to be adequately informed,” which 
I shall, following the Court, refer to as the right to a free and informed vote. Th e Court 
in Harper further elaborated the requirements for a free and informed vote. Th e fi rst 
requirement for discursive equality is that voters are adequately informed of all the 
political positions supported by candidates and parties.217 An informed voter “must 
be able to weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses of each candidate and political 
party… [and] must also be able to consider opposing aspects of issues associated with 
certain candidates and political parties where they exist.”218 Th e second requirement is 
that all candidates and political parties are given a reasonable opportunity to present 
their positions to voters.219 Th ese two requirements share the same ultimate objective: 
to ensure that voters are fully informed about their choices.
Once again, there is a structural dimension to the Court’s description of the right 
to a free and informed vote. Th e Court is concerned that a voter’s information about an 
election can be negatively impacted by unregulated spending on political advertising. 
According to the Court, the “unequal dissemination of points of view undermines the 
voter’s ability to be adequately informed of all views.”220 Th ird party spending limits 
are essential because if “a few groups are able to fl ood the electoral discourse with their 
message, it is possible, indeed likely, that the voices of some will be drowned out.”221 
Because people have unequal fi nancial resources, direct state intervention is required 
to prevent the wealthy from exerting a disproportionate infl uence on the electoral 
process.222 Th e concern here is the “unequal dissemination of points of view.”223 Such 
214. Th omson Newspapers, supra note 10; Libman, supra note 10; Harper, supra note 10; Bryan, 
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an unequal dissemination will result in the voter not being adequately informed, which 
in turn aff ects the voter’s ability to participate meaningfully in the electoral process.224 
Th e Court focused considerable attention on the right to a free and informed 
vote in Bryan.225 Th e case concerned the constitutionality of a provision of the 
Canada Elections Act that prohibited the transmission of election results between 
electoral ridings before the closing of all polling stations in Canada. Th e claimant 
had posted election results from Atlantic Canada on a website while polls were still 
open in other electoral ridings.226 A fi ve-to-four majority of the Court held that 
although the provision infringed the freedom of expression as protected by section 
2(b), it could nonetheless be upheld under section 1. In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
Abella argued that the provision violated the freedom of expression in addition to not 
meeting the proportionality test under section 1.227 Given the eff ect of staggered 
voting hours on reducing informational imbalance, Justice Abella concluded that 
the publication ban was an “excessive response to an insuffi  ciently proven harm.”228
It is notable that the government explicitly identifi ed “informational 
equality among voters” as one of the objectives of the legislation.229 Th e notion of 
informational equality has a structural dimension because it demands inquiry into 
the system by which voters gain information about an election. In the opinion 
for the majority, Justice Bastarache characterized the objective of the provision 
as “ensur[ing] informational equality by adopting reasonable measures to deal 
with the perception of unfairness created when some voters have general access 
to information that is denied to others, and the further possibility that access to 
that information will aff ect voter participation or choices.”230 Th e idea is that the 
“participation or choices” of voters will be aff ected by their access to information. 
Justice Bastarache concluded that the objective of ensuring informational equality 
was pressing and substantial, and that the provision satisfi ed the proportionality 
stage of the Oakes test.231 He noted that informational equality is a “centrally 
important element of the concept of electoral fairness” and that the Court had 
previously held, in Libman and Harper, that the promotion of electoral fairness 
is a pressing and substantial objective.232 Additionally, Justice Bastarache referred 
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to the results of the Lortie Report, which indicated that the public was opposed to 
informational imbalances among voters.233 Th e right to a free and informed vote has 
a structural dimension because it is concerned with the system-wide distribution of 
electorally relevant information to voters.
On a fi nal note, the constitutional status of these two rights—the right to equal 
participation and the right to a free and informed vote—is somewhat ambiguous. 
Th e Court described them initially as “principles,” but it also described each as 
consisting of a “right” held by electors. Christopher Bredt and Margot Finley 
criticize the apparent constitutional status of the right to a free and informed 
vote.234 Th ey note that the Court in Bryan found that the voters’ freedom of 
expression interest did not necessarily “supersede the value of the countervailing 
principle that no voter should have general access to information about the results 
of elections unavailable to others.”235 According to Bredt and Finley, however, the 
freedom of expression should supersede the “putative inherently important goal 
of informational equality”236 because the former is a “right explicitly guaranteed 
in the Charter while the [latter] is a principle the value of which is not at all clear, 
and certainly not from the evidence before the Court.”237 At the very least, I suggest 
that these rights serve as interpretive principles that the Court has endorsed to show 
its adoption of the egalitarian model. Th e rights to equal participation and a free 
and informed vote are soft rights or quasi-rights that provide content and meaning 
to the Court’s understanding of democracy and the right to vote.
C. DEMOCRATIC COMPLEXITY
In its law of democracy decisions, the Court has developed a set of jurisprudential 
tools that enable it to regulate the democratic process. Th e Court has identifi ed a 
number of democratic rights, and it has described these rights in structural terms. 
Th e Court’s bundle of democratic rights approach has enabled it to tackle complex 
problems, including the structure of democratic institutions, the regulation 
of political parties, the role of money in elections, individual participation, 
the redrawing of electoral boundaries, and campaign advertising. Although the 
Court’s multifaceted approach has enabled it to address many aspects of democratic 
governance, there are some disadvantages to this approach. As many scholars have 
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argued, there are signifi cant tensions among the Court’s law of democracy 
decisions. I suggest that these tensions can be explained in part by the fact that 
the Court has recognized a multiplicity of democratic rights. In this section, I fi rst 
consider the arguments in the scholarly literature that have criticized the Court 
for its lack of consistency. I then show that for its part, the Court has attempted 
to erase any inconsistency by reinterpreting the rights to fi t with one another. 
Instead of suppressing these tensions, I suggest that the Court should retain the 
complexity and render it transparent.
As many commentators have noted, there are tensions among the Court’s 
decisions. Andrew Geddis argues that there is a tension between Libman and 
Th omson Newspapers.238 According to Geddis, Libman espoused an egalitarian 
approach while Th omson Newspapers emphasized individual participation.239 
In addition, Geddis claims that the dissenting justices’ position in Harper was 
consistent with the holding in Th omson Newspapers because the “minority in 
Harper in practice gives primacy to the individual right of unencumbered—or 
“eff ective”—electoral participation.”240 Christopher Manfredi and Mark Rush 
similarly note that Figueroa protects an individual right to vote, which is in tension 
with the egalitarian model.241
In a similar vein, Jamie Cameron argues that the Harper decision’s emphasis 
on the egalitarian model essentially undermined the Court’s earlier protection of 
the principle of meaningful participation in Figueroa. Cameron asserts that the 
Court in the Harper case “resisted section 2(b)’s values, as well as the evidentiary 
requirements of section 1, to uphold provisions that eff ectively exclude citizens 
from the democratic process.”242 According to Cameron, the Court in Harper 
had to make a choice between the egalitarian model announced in Libman and 
the principle of meaningful participation that was announced in Figueroa.243 As 
Cameron argues, the two ideas are diffi  cult to reconcile.244 Th e decision in Figueroa 
thus had to be “explained away,” and to do so, Justice Bastarache held that the 
right of participation under section 3 (which was at stake in Figueroa) cannot be 
claimed in a case involving section 2 (which was at stake in Harper).245 
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Cameron points out that if the rights of the voters were comprised by the rules 
disadvantaging smaller parties (as the Court held in Figueroa), then “it would be 
impossible for limits which directly prohibit individuals from playing a role in 
election debate not to constitute a more serious interference with rights protected 
by section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom.”246 Justice Bastarache’s refusal to 
extend Figueroa’s participation principle to section 2(b) suggests that third party 
advertising undermines meaningful participation because there is an unequal 
dissemination of points of view, which, in turn, negatively aff ects the voter’s ability 
to become informed.247 Th e contradiction that emerges is that more information 
hinders rather than helps the voter’s quest to be informed. As Cameron points out, 
Justice Bastarache’s position is in some tension with his earlier stance in Th omson 
Newspapers that voters are rational actors and should be exposed to, rather than 
protected from, information that is relevant to the political process.248 Th e Court 
ended up with a position in which the rights under section 3 and section 2(b) are 
treated as being inconsistent.249 In this way, the Harper court was able to conclude 
that it was necessary to limit the speech of third parties in order to protect the 
voters.250 Cameron argues that the Harper majority “contrived a confl ict between 
the rights of voters and the rights of would-be participants to avoid Figueroa’s 
principle of meaningful participation.”251 According to Cameron, it is not clear 
why the section 3 right to an egalitarian process should trump the section 2(b) 
right to free expression.252
Christopher Bredt and Margot Finley argue with respect to the Bryan 
decision that the Court’s recognition of informational equality raises certain 
problems.253 In Bryan, the Court stated that the objective of informational 
equality was consistent with the egalitarian model (which it had already 
endorsed). Informational equality means that all voters have access or are 
exposed to the same information, and it was supported by the Court on the 
basis that it enhances electoral fairness. As Bredt and Finley point out, the 
Court “found that the fairness of Canada’s electoral process demands that 
no individual voter have access to general information not available to any 
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other voter.”254 Yet Bredt and Finley dispute the notion that informational 
equality is actually “required under the Constitution or that informational 
equality is an essential component of maintaining confi dence in the electoral 
process.”255 Th ey question whether informational equality is either a realistic 
or a desirable objective, especially since there are any number of aspects of 
the electoral process, such as the resources available to political parties, that 
cannot be, and perhaps should not be, equalized.256 Bredt and Finley point out 
the multiple ways in which voters across the country have access to diff erent 
kinds of information; indeed, such disparities are essential in order for voters 
to have information about local issues and concerns.257
Instead of acknowledging these tensions, the Court has attempted to 
conceptually unify the various democratic rights recognized in its cases. To 
do so, the Court has tended to suppress the tensions among confl icting rights 
by redefi ning the rights at stake. Consider, for example, the Court’s treatment 
of the right to a free and informed vote. In Th omson Newspapers, the Court 
adopted a libertarian approach when it equated the right to a free and informed 
vote with access to all electorally relevant information. In Harper and Bryan, 
by contrast, the right to a free and informed vote was explicitly connected to 
the egalitarian model. Th e right to a free and informed vote was equated with 
restrictions on the dissemination of electorally relevant information. 
To minimize the discord among rights, the Court connected the right to 
a free and informed vote to the other democratic rights it had recognized. In 
Harper, for example, the Court created a conceptual link between the right 
to a free and informed vote and the right to play a meaningful role in the 
democratic process. It noted that:
Th is case engages the informational component of an individual’s right to meaningfully 
participate in the electoral process. Th e right to meaningful participation includes a 
citizen’s right to exercise his or her vote in an informed manner. For a voter to be well 
informed, the citizen must be able to weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each candidate and political party. Th e citizen must also be able to consider opposing 
aspects of issues associated with certain candidates and political parties where 
they exist. In short, the voter has a right to be “reasonably informed of all the 
possible choices.”258
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Th us a voter can only meaningfully participate in the electoral process if she 
is reasonably informed. Th e majority in Harper also connected the right to a free 
and informed vote to the right to equal participation in democratic governance. 
Th e Court stated that the electoral process is fair provided that “equality in the 
political discourse” exists.259
Th e problem of confl icting rights is a signifi cant one, and while it is beyond 
the scope of this article to propose a comprehensive solution, it is possible to sketch 
the outlines of an alternative approach. I propose that instead of suppressing the 
confl icts among rights, the Court should be transparent about these confl icts 
and the trade-off s that such confl icts entail. Democratic values are always, and 
unavoidably, in tension with one another, and for this reason, there will inevitably be 
trade-off s among the various rights that constitute the right to vote and democracy 
more generally.
Instead of submerging the confl icts among rights as the Court has tended to 
do, I claim that the Court should explicitly identify the competing democratic 
rights that are at stake in the cases and justify the conclusion it reaches as to which 
right to favour. Th e regulation of democracy inescapably involves competing 
principles, and it is preferable for these competing considerations to be openly 
acknowledged. Indeed, Justice Bastarache noted in Th omson Newspapers that the 
freedom of expression and the right to vote are distinct rights and that, in the 
event they come into confl ict, the rights must be balanced in such a way as to 
respect both rights.260 Th e same approach should be adopted for confl icts within 
the bundle of democratic rights. In general, judicial transparency about these 
trade-off s is preferable to a forced coherence, at least from a democratic perspective. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Th is article has focused on the Court’s theory of democratic rights. I claim that the 
Court has adopted a novel approach to democratic rights, one that provides a new way 
for courts to engage in the oversight of democracy. First, I argue that the Court has 
adopted a “bundle of democratic rights” approach to its understanding of the right to 
vote. By this I mean that the Court has interpreted the right to vote as a plural right; 
that is, the right to vote is an umbrella concept that consists of several democratic 
rights. I identify four democratic rights in the Court’s law of democracy decisions: 
(1) the right to eff ective representation; (2) the right to meaningful participation; 
(3) the right to equal participation; and (4) the right to a free and informed vote. 
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In addition, this article argues that the four democratic rights identifi ed by 
the Court are best understood as structural rights. Th e concept of structural rights 
captures an unusual feature of the Court’s approach, namely, that the Court has 
described these rights so as to capture both the individual and the institutional 
dimensions of democratic participation. By engaging in an in-depth examination 
of the Court’s decisions, I show that the four democratic rights mentioned above 
have a structural dimension. Although the Court describes these rights as being 
held by individuals, it is attuned to how the broader institutional framework aff ects 
the exercise of these rights.
I argue that it is possible for courts to regulate the structural dimensions of 
the democratic system by using the mechanism of individual rights. I show how 
the Court has used the subsidiary democratic rights not only to protect the right 
to vote but also to regulate the structure of democratic institutions. In so doing, 
the Court has resolved disputes over a wide array of complex issues, including 
electoral redistricting, campaign fi nance regulation, individual participation, 
political equality, and the regulation of political parties. A signifi cant advantage to 
using rights is that courts can respond to structural problems without intervening 
too directly in the democratic process. 
Although the Court’s bundle of democratic rights approach provides it with 
fl exible jurisprudential tools, this approach also poses certain challenges. As many 
commentators have noted, the Court’s election-law cases are at times inconsistent 
with one another. Th is article suggests that some of the internal tensions in the 
Court’s decisions can be explained by the confl icts that exist among these democratic 
rights. Th e democratic rights identifi ed by the Court are not always consistent with 
one another because they refl ect the competing values of democracy itself. Instead 
of suppressing the confl icts among these rights, I claim that the Court should 
render these confl icts transparent and provide a justifi cation for the resolution 
it ultimately reaches.
In sum, the Court’s approach to democratic rights has provided it with the 
conceptual resources to respond to the highly complex nature of democratic 
governance and participation. By diversifying the right to vote so that it includes 
additional democratic rights, the Court has developed a set of sophisticated 
jurisprudential tools with which to regulate the democratic process. Th e Court’s 
attention to the structural dimension of democratic rights not only enables it to 
respond to the individual and institutional aspects of democracy, it also sheds 
fresh light on the nature of democratic rights. Th e Court’s approach serves as a 
helpful paradigm for courts in other jurisdictions that are also facing the challenges 
associated with the judicial review of the laws of democracy.
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